Pages that link to "Item:Q4262868"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (Q4262868):
Displayed 50 items.
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors (Q308659) (← links)
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach (Q337786) (← links)
- Bounded memory and permanent reputations (Q392656) (← links)
- Propaganda and credulity (Q523483) (← links)
- Committee design with endogenous participation (Q523502) (← links)
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems (Q533088) (← links)
- Quality distortions in vertical relations (Q547317) (← links)
- Signaling drive over the long term (Q617561) (← links)
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations (Q665455) (← links)
- Informal communication (Q707291) (← links)
- Committees, sequential voting and transparency (Q1005748) (← links)
- A theory of political cycles (Q1017789) (← links)
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism (Q1036595) (← links)
- Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding (Q1036601) (← links)
- Delegated portfolio management (Q1083347) (← links)
- Voting in the limelight (Q1616074) (← links)
- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion (Q1622464) (← links)
- Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value (Q1654156) (← links)
- Minority perception of exclusion and promotion hurdles (Q1668163) (← links)
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance (Q1674980) (← links)
- Preselection and expert advice (Q1677246) (← links)
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types (Q1757549) (← links)
- Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect (Q1793302) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs (Q1994202) (← links)
- Creating confusion (Q1995296) (← links)
- Reputation and earnings dynamics (Q1995304) (← links)
- Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power (Q1996131) (← links)
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives (Q2067358) (← links)
- Reputation and the ``need for enemies'' (Q2074052) (← links)
- Information manipulation and competition (Q2078046) (← links)
- Risk aversion, managerial reputation, and debt-equity conflict (Q2091658) (← links)
- Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets (Q2098868) (← links)
- Simple equilibria in general contests (Q2155902) (← links)
- Starting small to communicate (Q2173403) (← links)
- Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination (Q2180753) (← links)
- Investment timing, agency and overconfidence (Q2183206) (← links)
- Reputation and news suppression in the media industry (Q2206812) (← links)
- Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns (Q2231392) (← links)
- Working to learn (Q2231428) (← links)
- Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets (Q2299461) (← links)
- Capital immobility and the reach for yield (Q2324831) (← links)
- Committees with leaks (Q2343395) (← links)
- A dynamic model of certification and reputation (Q2343482) (← links)
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games (Q2345217) (← links)
- Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections (Q2359398) (← links)
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (Q2373776) (← links)
- Signal jamming in pretrial negotiation with multiple defendants (Q2384795) (← links)
- On the drawbacks of large committees (Q2398198) (← links)
- Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent (Q2402822) (← links)
- Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired (Q2415994) (← links)