AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION (Q2883140): Difference between revisions

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+Agreeing to disagree
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+Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
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+Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
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+Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
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+Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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+Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
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+On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
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+Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
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+Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
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+Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
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+The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
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