Information structures in economics. Studies in the theory of markets with imperfect information (Q1054246): Difference between revisions

This book is organized in three parts; the first one treating preliminaries, the second treating special topics in macroeconomic analysis of imperfect information, the third one dealing with future markets. The preliminary part, which takes about fifty pages, contains, first adapted to the author's terminology, the definition of information structures, decision rules, comparison of informativeness of situations (chapter I), a set of examples (chapter 2), where by means of a counterexample it is shown that smaller error margins do not imply better information. This counterexample assumes a utility function which requires biased information however. Then, game theory is reviewed (chapter 3). The second part, which deals more concretely with the subject, starts with the formulation of the basic model. Homogeneous producers with constant marginal costs (taken to be zero) are assumed throughout. The resulting price configuration is the subject studied. Chapter 5 analyses the outcome when the market structure is symmetric with respect to firms, in terms of demand, while chapter 6 treats the same subject when information is asymmetric with respect to firms. Chapter 7, which concludes part 2, deals with the issue of quality-price interaction. The third part is confined to sequential future markets. Chapter 8 contains the model formulation, discusses optimal strategies and the value of information. This last topic is treated in more depth in chapter 9, while chapter 10 concludes the volume with some generalizations (e.g. multi-period markets).