Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers (Q1865221): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 20:08, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers |
scientific article |
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Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers (English)
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25 March 2003
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This paper considers Rubinstein bargaining, with the number of bargainers \(n> 2\). The main result is that if the first player to propose can make either conditional or unconditional offers, then there exists a unique subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium. This result extends Rubinstein's for \(n= 2\) case, as well as \textit{V. Krishna} and \textit{R. Serrano} [Rev. Econ. Stud. 63, 61--80 (1996; Zbl 0844.90122)] in a related \(n\)-player game.
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bargaining
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conditional and unconditional offers
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