Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism (Q1423684): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:33, 19 March 2024

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Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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    Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism (English)
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    7 March 2004
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    The problem of reaching core outcomes through revelation matching mechanism for the arriage market , using a stable matching rule has been studied intensively during last decades. But the non-revelation mechanism is not studied so intensively. Here, a full extension of the serial dictatorship mechanism and so-called Alcade et al. mechanism [\textit{J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina}, ''Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problem''. Games Econ. Behavior, 31(2), 294-302 (2000; Zbl 1065.91544)] are provided. In the mechanism proposed the women,s strategies are chosen simultaneously at the beginning of the game and actual matching is then selected by the men sequentially. A new idea explored in the paper is that one can regard some non-revelation mechanisms as simple procedure that can work well: both sides of the market use simple strategies and the equilibrium outcomes are the stable matching under the true preferences.
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    stable matching
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    subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
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    direct mechanism
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    strong equilibrium
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