Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1 (Q4610821): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 00:55, 20 March 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005484
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1 |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7005484 |
Statements
Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1 (English)
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23 January 2019
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public-good provision
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mechanism design
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voting mechanisms
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