The effects of open innovation platform knowledge strategies on participants: evolutionary game research (Q2004117): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Created a new Item |
Set OpenAlex properties. |
||
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/4012713 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W3087147651 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Revision as of 03:49, 20 March 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | The effects of open innovation platform knowledge strategies on participants: evolutionary game research |
scientific article |
Statements
The effects of open innovation platform knowledge strategies on participants: evolutionary game research (English)
0 references
14 October 2020
0 references
Summary: Based on previous research on open innovation and appropriability strategies, using knowledge production functions and evolutionary game methods, this paper describes the process of dynamic cooperation between open innovation platforms and their participants. This paper specifically analyzes the influence of open innovation platform's knowledge appropriability/knowledge sharing strategies, as well as participants' exit/nonexit strategy, on the cooperative relationship. Through simulation analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the knowledge appropriability strategy of the open innovation platform and the participant's nonexit strategy is an important strategic point of the cooperation between open innovation platforms and participants; second, the amount of knowledge production affects the strategic choices of open innovation platforms, while the knowledge increment affects the strategic choices of participants; third, the appreciation coefficient of complementary assets determines the direction of evolution of the cooperation process.
0 references