Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem (Q1178254): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank
 
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Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 12:23, 15 May 2024

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Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
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    Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem (English)
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    26 June 1992
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    deferred acceptance algorithm
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    marriage problem
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    stable matching
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