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Property / author: John V. Howard / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:52, 15 May 2024

scientific article
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English
A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
scientific article

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    A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium (English)
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    28 June 1992
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    generalized Nash bargaining solution
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    unique perfect equilibrium outcome
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    game of perfect information
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