Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences (Q1191821): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3
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+W1977953904
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+Q3066116
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+The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank @@
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
@@ Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank @@
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+Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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+Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
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+Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
@@ Property / cites work: Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets / rank @@
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+Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
@@ Property / cites work: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept / rank @@
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The assignment game. I: The core
@@ Property / cites work: The assignment game. I: The core / rank @@
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