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Property / cites work: Endogenous Formation of Coalitions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: On weighted Shapley values / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Multilinear Extensions of Games / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q4178815 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q5817870 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:53, 16 May 2024

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The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value
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    The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value (English)
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    12 January 1993
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    The first author [Manage. Sci., Appl. 18, 64--79 (1972; Zbl 0239.90049)] has shown that the Shapley value of an \(n\)-person game could be obtained by integrating the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the main diagonal of the unit cube. This technique has been used by \textit{E. Kalai} and \textit{D. Samet} [in: `The Shapley Value', Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 83--99 (1988; Zbl 0708.90098)] for the weighted Shapley value. In this paper, the authors modify the method to calculate the modified value for games with coalition structure, games which take account of the possibility that some coalitions are more likely to form than others.
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    Shapley value
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    modified value
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