Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems (Q1328149): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal Contracts for Teams / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 16:45, 22 May 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
scientific article

    Statements

    Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    4 July 1994
    0 references
    0 references
    agency problems
    0 references
    incentive structures
    0 references
    moral hazard
    0 references