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Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:27, 23 May 2024

scientific article
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English
Protective behavior in matching models
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    Protective behavior in matching models (English)
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    1 April 1996
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    lexical maximin strategies
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    protective behavior
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    two-sided matching
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    mechanisms
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    college-admissions model
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    Shapley-Shubik assignment model
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