On probability models in voting theory (Q4850103): Difference between revisions

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+Q2783476
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+Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation
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+Q3266133
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+Q3241504
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+Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
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+Condorcet's paradox
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+Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and proportional lottery rules
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+The effect of social homogeneity on coincidence probabilities for pairwise proportional lottery and simple majority rules
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Q5661032
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+The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
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+Q4739824
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+Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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