Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model (Q1371188): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2293 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:43, 27 May 2024

scientific article
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Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
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    Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model (English)
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    28 October 1997
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    chief executive officer
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    CEO compensation
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    agency theory
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    pay performance sensitivity
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