Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model (Q1371188): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives and Aggregate Shocks
@@ Property / cites work: Incentives and Aggregate Shocks / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
@@ Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
+Normal rank