Strategy-proofness and ``median voters'' (Q1376987): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:34, 28 May 2024

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Strategy-proofness and ``median voters''
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    Strategy-proofness and ``median voters'' (English)
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    1 February 1998
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    strategy-proofness
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    single-peaked preferences
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    augmented median-voter solutions
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