The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (Q1390201): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:09, 28 May 2024

scientific article
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English
The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration
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    The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (English)
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    14 July 1998
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    hierarchical planning
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    information asymmetry
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    self-selection models
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    design of a supply contract
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