The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (Q1390201): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Hierarchical structures in organizations: A conceptual framework / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 13:09, 28 May 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration |
scientific article |
Statements
The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (English)
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14 July 1998
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hierarchical planning
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information asymmetry
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self-selection models
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design of a supply contract
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