Residence exchange wanted: A stable residence exchange problem (Q1268437): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(94)00358-0
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+W1973230403
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W1973230403 / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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