Optimal retention in agency problems (Q1276112): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 18:07, 28 May 2024

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Optimal retention in agency problems
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    Optimal retention in agency problems (English)
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    16 June 1999
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    single long-lived principal
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    series of short-lived agents
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    moral hazard
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    adverse selection
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