Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information (Q1278718): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Kashi R. Balachandran / rank
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Latest revision as of 17:36, 28 May 2024

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Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information
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    Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information (English)
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    22 February 1999
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    transfer price
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    moral hazard
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    private information
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    decentralized firm
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    information asymmetry
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    optimal coordination mechanisms
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