On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games (Q1289254): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
-Michel Le Breton
@@ Property / author: Michel Le Breton / rank @@
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-Shlomo Weber
@@ Property / author: Shlomo Weber / rank @@
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@@ Property / author @@
+Michel Le Breton
@@ Property / author: Michel Le Breton / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Shlomo Weber
@@ Property / author: Shlomo Weber / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
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+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2481
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+W2007105740
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2007105740 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3254691
@@ Property / cites work: Q3254691 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
@@ Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
@@ Property / cites work: Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:1289254