Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences (Q1296477): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:23, 28 May 2024

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Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
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    Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences (English)
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    16 April 2001
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    voting schemes
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    strategy-proofness
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    single-plateaued preferences
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    provision of one pure public good
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    strategy-proof voting schemes
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