Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors (Q1572940): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
RedirectionBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2592 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2033059935 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Agreeing to disagree / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Interactive epistemology. II: Probability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Common Priors: A Reply to Gul / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Reasoning about knowledge and probability / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4845472 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4221242 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Characterizing the common prior assumption. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: ``Knowing whether'', ``knowing that'', and the cardinality of state spaces / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Information, trade and common knowledge / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The incoherence of agreeing to disagree / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coherent behavior in noncooperative games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the logic of ``agreeing to disagree'' type results / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4340161 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4340096 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Iterated expectations and common priors / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Common priors and separation of convex sets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On general minimax theorems / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 12:45, 30 May 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
scientific article

    Statements

    Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    23 April 2002
    0 references
    Roughly speaking, the Common Prior Assumption (CPA) means that rational agents in models with asymmetric information have a common prior. \textit{R. J. Aumann} [Ann. Stat. 4, 1236-1239 (1976; Zbl 0379.62003)] proved that if CPA holds then agents cannot agree to disagree. In the present paper the converse statement is proved under an appropriate compactness condition. Also an example is given which demonstrates that the compactness assumption cannot be discarded. For a characterization of the CPA, the author adopts two distinct formalisms: the semantic and the syntactic.
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    common prior assumption
    0 references
    consistency condition
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references