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Latest revision as of 22:25, 3 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1694235
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English
The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1694235

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    The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games (English)
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    7 July 2002
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    The authors investigate three mini ultimatum games, one similar to \textit{G. E. Bolton} and \textit{R. Zwick} [Games Econ. Behav. 10, 95-121 (1995; Zbl 0831.90137)] and two others in which equal split was replaced by nearly equal split, once slightly favoring the proposer and once slightly favoring the responder. Such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust. However, it was observed that behavior changes dramatically and fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits.
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    payoff
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    ulimatum games
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    nearly equal split
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    proposer
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    responder
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