Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate (Q1599831): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown) | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W3122718599 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Incumbent reputations and ideological campaign contributions in spatial competition / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Q3245648 / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Latest revision as of 10:27, 4 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate |
scientific article |
Statements
Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate (English)
0 references
5 August 2002
0 references
Two candidates simultaneously choose positions on a finite set of points in a one-dimensional policy space. A voter votes for the candidate closest to his or her ideal policy position. If there are no extraneous factors, both candidates adopt a median position and each has a \(\frac{1}{2}\) probability of winning. However, in normal elections, extraneous factors do intrude. In this paper the authors analyze the situation where one candidate enjoys an `image' advantage over the other. The advantage is taken to be constant for all voters. The principal focus of the authors is the situation where the image advantage is small (less than the distance between the points in the policy-space). The authors show that under certain assumptions, the candidate with the advantage chooses a centralist policy stance, but the equilibrium strategy is mixed, while the disadvantaged candidate chooses a mixed U-shaped strategy to establish the distance from the advantaged candidate. The pure strategy result when there is no advantage is shown to be a degenerate limiting case as the advantage tends to zero.
0 references
Downsian model
0 references
mixed strategy
0 references
simultaneous location
0 references
valence issues
0 references
0 references