Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted (Q697934): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2794 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 17:18, 4 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
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    Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted (English)
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    18 September 2002
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    social choice
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    strategyproofness
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    lotteries
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    Gibbard
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    Satterthwaite
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    ties
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