Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems (Q700121): Difference between revisions

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+W1969451165
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+Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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+House allocation with transfers
@@ Property / cites work: House allocation with transfers / rank @@
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
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+Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
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