Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1867775): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:46, 5 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
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    Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (English)
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    2 April 2003
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    indivisible objects
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    strategy-proofness
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    population-monotonicity
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