Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument (Q1871136): Difference between revisions

The author investigates and criticizes in great detail Penrose's later (1994) argument against computer mechanism [see Sections 3.16 and 3.23 of \textit{R. Penrose}'s book, Shadows of the mind. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press (1995; Zbl 0847.00001)]. Recall that anti-mechanist approaches to modeling the human mind began with J. R. Lucas in 1961. They were significantly extended by Penrose in 1989. Both approaches hinge on the belief that the incompleteness of arithmetic provides all the logical, philosophical, and rational resources necessary to refute any claim made by a computer mechanist. In the present paper, the author vigorously defends the view that Penrose's new argument seems to invoke an unrestricted truth predicate and an unrestricted knowability predicate. However, then the premises are inconsistent. Further, he challenges anti-mechanists to provide a sound argument that does not use unrestricted truth and knowability predicates.