The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. (Q1420529): Difference between revisions

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+Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
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+A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
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+Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
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+Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
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+Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
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+The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
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+Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
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+Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
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+Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
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+Extending Condorcet's rule
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