Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (Q1421881): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Monotone Comparative Statics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Potential games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contracting with Externalities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Generalization of the Maximum Theorem / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 14:35, 6 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
scientific article

    Statements

    Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (English)
    0 references
    3 February 2004
    0 references
    0 references
    Unique implementation
    0 references
    Supermodular games
    0 references
    Potential
    0 references
    Simultaneous and sequential Cournot adjustment (tatônnement)
    0 references
    0 references