Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems (Q1886747): Difference between revisions

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+H. J. M. Peters
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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2071697652
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
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+Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
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+The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
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