In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+Publication
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: Publication / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.007
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2167392224
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2167392224 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
@@ Property / cites work: Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games of manipulation in marriage problems
@@ Property / cites work: Games of manipulation in marriage problems / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:705854