House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence (Q2387316): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.008 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 14:57, 10 June 2024

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House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
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    House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence (English)
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    2 September 2005
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    Core
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    House allocation
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    Housing lottery
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    Indivisible goods
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    Matching
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