Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation (Q2573267): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2005.01.006 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2083092421 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 12:29, 11 June 2024

scientific article
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Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
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    Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation (English)
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    7 November 2005
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    Strategy-proofness
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    Envy-freeness
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    Pivotal mechanism
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    Indivisible objects
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