Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates (Q1252142): Difference between revisions

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+Q2783476
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+Democratic preference functions
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+Realization of Choice Functions
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+Rational Selection of Decision Functions
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+Q5668657
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+Positionalist voting functions
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+The independence condition in the theory of social choice
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+A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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+Two-Person Cooperative Games
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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