Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness (Q1141566): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 05:27, 13 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness |
scientific article |
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Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness (English)
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1980
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randomized preference aggregation
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additivity of power
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strategy proofness
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mixed social welfare functions
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strict social welfare scheme
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allocation of power
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probability measure
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decision schemes
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voting
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decision superscheme
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Arrow's impossibility theorem
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binary social welfare scheme
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Paretian social welfare scheme
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