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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90092-9 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 15:47, 14 June 2024

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On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
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    On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives (English)
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    1984
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    The usual order \(<\) in the set of alternatives \(X:=\{1,...,n\}\) is interpreted as a preference relation over X. A binary relation \(\lesssim\) in the set of all nonempty subsets of X may satisfy the following conditions: (1) Weak dominance principle: \(\{\) \(i\} \prec\{i,j\}\prec\{j\}\) whenever \(i<j\); (2) Weak independence: \(A\cup C\lesssim B\cup C\) whenever \(A\prec B\) and C is disjoint both from A and B. The authors prove that every ordering \(\lesssim\) satisfying (1) and (2) also satisfies: \(A\sim\{\min A\), max \(A\}\). Here is another result: If \(\lesssim\) satisfies (1) and (2) then there exists a real function f defined over \(\{(i,j)\in X^ 2|\) \(i\leq j\}\) such that (3) \(A\lesssim B\) if and only if \(f(\min A,\quad\max A)\leq f(\min B,\quad\max B).\) Three conditions are specified which satisfies every such function f. Conversely, every real function f satisfying those three conditions determines, by means of (3), an ordering satisfying (1) and (2). The authors interpret ranking of the sets of alternatives in terms of the choice under uncertainty. They also try to apply the developed theory to welfare economics. The most quoted item is a paper by \textit{Y. Kannai} and \textit{B. Peleg} [J. Econ. Theory 32, 172-175 (1984; Zbl 0533.90005)].
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    extension of order to power sets
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    ranking sets of alternatives
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    choice under uncertainty
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