An economic theory of public facilities in space (Q1060120): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 18:07, 14 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | An economic theory of public facilities in space |
scientific article |
Statements
An economic theory of public facilities in space (English)
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1985
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The paper deals with the determination of the number and locations of facilities in which a public service is made available to consumers. The solutions obtained by planning and voting are characterized and compared. Planning is made by reference to a social welfare function, voting is based on the majority rule principle. Not surprisingly, the outcomes depend on the particular taxation scheme implemented. Two particular, but meaningful, schemes are considered. The first is a benefit taxation based on consumers locations. Under these circumstances, the Pareto-optimal configuration is (unanimously) supported by voting. The second scheme is an income taxation. Then the Pareto-optimal configuration is no longer supported by majority voting. Instead voting yields a configuration which turns out to be the Rawlsian configuration.
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facility location
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public service
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planning
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voting
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social welfare function
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majority rule
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taxation
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Pareto-optimal configuration
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