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Latest revision as of 18:43, 17 June 2024

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An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
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    An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value (English)
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    1987
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    The \(\tau\)-value is characterized by three axioms. It is shown that the \(\tau\)-value is the unique solution concept which is efficient and has the minimal right property and the restricted proportionality property. The minimal right property is weaker than the additivity property, which plays a role in the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value: together with individual rationality and efficiency additivity implies the minimal right property. The restricted proportionality property says that for games with minimal right vector zero, the dividend given to the players is proportional to the marginal contribution of the players to the grand coalition.
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    \(\tau \)-value
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    minimal right property
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    restricted proportionality property
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    axiomatic characterization
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    Shapley value
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