A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma (Q1108949): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Q3813639 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Revision as of 19:01, 18 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma |
scientific article |
Statements
A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma (English)
0 references
1988
0 references
We follow a non-equilibrium approach to the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with trigger strategies. Each player has a probability distribution which gives the probability with which he thinks the other player first plans to cheat in any given period. We show that, provided that this probability distribution assigns some minimum weight to all periods, the players will cooperate for most of the game if it is repeated enough times.
0 references
bounded rationality
0 references
non-equilibrium approach
0 references
finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
0 references
trigger strategies
0 references