Corrigendum to: ``Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games'' (Q911491): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 14:08, 20 June 2024
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English | Corrigendum to: ``Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games'' |
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Corrigendum to: ``Perfect equilibrium in non-randomized strategies in a class of symmetric dynamic games'' (English)
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1989
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An error occurs in the proof of Lemma II.10 of the above-mentioned paper [the author, ibid. 47, No.1, 153-177 (1989; Zbl 0684.90109)]. It was claimed on p. 171 that if \(V_ n\), \(\psi_ n\) converged weakly to V, \({\hat \psi}\) (henceforth written \(V_ n\Rightarrow V\), \({\hat \psi}{}_ n\Rightarrow {\hat \psi})\) and f is strictly increasing then \(V_ n\circ f\circ {\hat \psi}_ n\Rightarrow V\circ f\circ {\hat \psi}\). This is not always true unless \({\hat \psi}\) is (strictly) increasing from the left at all continuity points. The lemma is, however, correct. A new proof is given here.
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perfect equilibrium
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oligopolistic exploitation
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common-property resources
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dynamic game
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compact state space
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deterministic transition function
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instantaneous utility function
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existence of a symmetric stationary equilibrium
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