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Latest revision as of 09:22, 24 June 2024

scientific article
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Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
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    Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting (English)
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    1991
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    The authors introduce four independent axioms which are necessary and sufficient for a choice aggregation procedure to be approval voting. A characterization of plurality voting is obtained as a corollary of this result.
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    axioms
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    choice aggregation
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    plurality voting
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