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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:26, 24 June 2024

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Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
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    Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information (English)
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    16 February 2006
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    common interest
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    pure coordination
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    perfect information
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    subgame perfect equilibrium
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    asynchronous move
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    repeated game
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    anti-folk theorem
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