Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? (Q816096): Difference between revisions

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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6594-1 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2055403057 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q3748279 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures / rank
 
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Property / cites work: On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle / rank
 
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Revision as of 10:37, 24 June 2024