Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation (Q2490939): Difference between revisions

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+Dictatorial domains
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+Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
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+Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?
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+A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
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+Social aggregators
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+Q5635232
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+Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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