Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study (Q2500704): Difference between revisions
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0024-8 / rank | |||
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| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2026944621 / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Partially monotonic bargaining solutions / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 18:24, 24 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study |
scientific article |
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Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study (English)
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18 August 2006
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