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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2006.09.002 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 12:49, 25 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Dichotomy for voting systems
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    Dichotomy for voting systems (English)
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    22 January 2007
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    computational complexity
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    elections
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    election manipulation
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    scoring systems
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    dichotomy theorems
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    voting
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